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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a federal prosecutor and the following case
file is placed on your desk. Mayberry National Bank recently caught
its security guard, Barney F., attempting to steal money from the back
of an armored truck. Barney was caught by bank teller, Gomer P.,
who noticed Barney acting suspicious near the armored truck. Barney
acted scared and agitated when confronted by Gomer. When Gomer
asked Barney what he was doing, Barney never responded and main-
tained a deadpan reaction. Noticing money stuffed in Barney's slacks,
Gomer immediately yelled "citizen's arrest, citizen's arrest!"
You intend to prosecute Barney for attempted bank robbery and
would like to have Gomer testify regarding Barney's facial expression
and response of silence when confronted. However, you happen to be
a prosecutor in the Ninth Circuit and you have not read the recent
Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Oplinger.2 You are concerned
that Gomer's testimony regarding Barney's silence may be inadmissi-
ble because it is privileged under the Fifth Amendment.
Up until United States v. Oplinger, the Ninth Circuit had never
squarely addressed whether pre-arrest silence could be used as sub-
stantive evidence of guilt.3 In United States v. Thompson,4 the Ninth
Circuit faced the issue but ultimately concluded that the lack of any
controlling authority on the matter rendered the point too unclear to
permit a finding of plain error.5
In Oplinger, however, the Ninth Circuit faced the issue again, this
time reaching a decision on the merits. The Oplinger court held that
"[n]either due process, fundamental fairness, or any more explicit
right contained in the Constitution is violated by the admission of the
silence of a person, not in custody or under indictment in the face of
accusations of criminal behavior."6
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Oplinger is significant for several
reasons: (1) the decision deadlocked the federal circuits (i.e., three to
three) with respect to the issue of pre-arrest silence as substantive
evidence of guilt;7 (2) the court extensively analyzes the unique con-
textual surroundings of a defendant's pre-arrest silence;8 and (3) the
court's decision pushes the divergent circuit opinions surrounding pre-
2. 150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998).
3. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1993)(stating that the appeals
court need not address the issue since the trial court gave a curative instruction
telling the jury not to consider silence as evidence of guilt).
4. 82 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996).
5. See id. at 854-56.
6. Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1067.
7. See infra Part 1.C for a discussion on the split among the circuit courts.
8. See infra Part Il for a discussion on the significance of context in asserting the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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arrest silence as substantive evidence to the point of "critical mass."9
In other words, the Oplinger opinion undoubtedly makes this issue
overly ripe for Supreme Court review.
Part II reviews the history of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, how "silence" may be used by the prosecu-
tion, and the current split in the circuits regarding pre-arrest silence.
Part III.A of this Note argues that there is neither a complete prohibi-
tion nor absolute permission to use pre-arrest silence as substantive
evidence. Part III.B argues that the minority circuits have erroneously
interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling in Jenkins v. Georgia and, as
such, incorrectly concluded that pre-arrest silence should not be al-
lowed as substantive evidence. Finally, Part III.C maintains that
Oplinger was correctly decided because it properly applied the Fifth
Amendment based upon the context of the coercion faced by the
defendant.
II. BACKGROUND
William Oplinger was employed as a supply coordinator for a bank
where he was responsible for the purchase and distribution of sup-
plies.' 0 Over a two-year period Oplinger engaged in a pattern of
purchasing unnecessary office supplies and returning those supplies
for cash refunds.l- Oplinger would keep the cash for his own purposes
and, over two years, he accumulated a total of $22,700.05 in refunds.12
On May 18, 1995, Oplinger's supervisor and another bank officer
met with Oplinger and asked him what he had done with the money.' 3
In response, Oplinger leaned back in his chair, placed his hands over
his eyes and said he did not know.14 Oplinger did not elaborate fur-
ther even when he was informed that bank regulators and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would have to be notified.'5
Oplinger was ultimately convicted on twenty-one counts of bank
fraud. 16 However, on appeal, Oplinger argued that the government
violated his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to due
process by unconstitutionally eliciting testimony regarding the May
18, 1995 meeting, and then by commenting on that testimony during
9. The "critical mass" has recently expanded with the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000). Contrary to the holding in
Oplinger, the Sixth Circuit held that the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendments privilege against
self-incrimination. See id. at 283.
10. See Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1063-64.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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its closing argument.17 Oplinger claims he gave a partial answer to
his supervisor when questioned regarding the refunded monies, but as
soon as he became aware that his answers would be reported to the
FBI, he chose to remain silent.' 8 Oplinger claims that the prosecu-
tor's reference to his "silence" was unconstitutional because "non-cus-
todial, pre-arrest, and investigatory assertions" of the right to remain
silent are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to due process.' 9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Oplinger's conviction and rejected his
argument that his pre-arrest silence was constitutionally protected by
the Fifth Amendment.20 In reaching its decision the Court noted that
"the government made no effort to compel Oplinger to speak; he was
free to act as he pleased."2 1
A. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The history of the modem privilege against self-incrimination can
be divided roughly into three steps, each of them captured by its own
distinctive formulation of the doctrine.2 2 At the earliest stage, the
privilege against self-incrimination was expressed in maxims like
nemo tenetur seipsu accusare ("no one shall be required to accuse him-
self') and nemo tenetur prodere seipsum ("no one shall be required to
betray himself').23 The United States Constitution embodies the sec-
ond stage formulation: no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."24 At the third stage (the modem
stage), the warning mandated by Miranda v. Arizona25 expresses the
general, though not universal, understanding of the privilege: you
have the right to remain silent.2 6
When judging the effect of state action on the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination, it is important to understand the
purposes underlying the clause. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion,2 7 the Supreme Court listed a number of reasons for the privilege.
Three of those reasons are particularly appropriate in the context of
pre-arrest silence: (1) the need to deter improper police behavior; (2)
17. See id. at 1065-66.
18. See id. at 1066.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 1066-67.
21. Id. at 1067.
22. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right
to Remain Silent, 94 MICH L. Rnv. 2625, 2638 (1996).
23. See id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Alschuler, supra note 22, at 2638.
25. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. See id. at 468-69.
27. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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the need to protect the values of the adversary system; and (3) the
need to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.
28
In 1966, the Supreme Court further interpreted the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination in Miranda v. Arizona.
2 9
The Miranda Court clarified that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination provided an accused person the right to re-
fuse to answer questions and remain silent when being interrogated
during the investigation of a crime.3 0 Specifically, the Court held that
the prosecution could not use statements obtained during a custodial
interrogation unless it demonstrated that certain procedural safe-
guards were present during questioning.3 1 The Court concluded that
without these safeguards, the custodial interrogation process contains
inherently coercive pressures that serve to weaken the accused's abil-
ity to resist and to force the accused to speak against his or her free
will.32
B. The Prosecution's Use of Silence
Although the Miranda decision established that an accused has
the right to remain silent, it did not address whether the prosecution
may use silence to imply that the defendant is guilty. Although the
Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether pre-arrest silence
may be used to imply guilt, it has ruled that pre-arrest silence may be
used to impeach a defendant's testimony.3 3 However, the Supreme
Court has also expressly held that the prosecution may not use post-
arrest silence 34 or the defendant's failure to take the stand to imply
guilt.3 5
1. Impeachment
The Supreme Court has long justified impeachment on the ground
that when a defendant chooses to testify, he waives his privilege
28. See id. at 55.
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. See id. at 444.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 467.
33. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982)(holding that the prosecution may use a
defendant's silence for impeachment purposes if the silence occurs after arrest
but before Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)(holding
that a prosecutor may use pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes).
34. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)(holding that the prosecution may not use a
defendant's silence to impeach if it occurs after arrest and Miranda warnings).
35. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)(holding that the Fifth Amendment
forbids the prosecution in a criminal case from commenting on the defendant's
failure to testify at trial and using such silence as evidence of the defendant's
guilt).
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against self-incrimination. 36 For example, the Supreme Court has
stated that if a defendant waives the right to remain silent at trial, he
"cannot then claim the privilege against cross-examination on matters
reasonably related to subject matter on his direct examination."
3 7
Likewise, the Court has allowed impeachment of the defendant with
illegally seized evidence if the defendant opens the door during direct
examination, and, in some instances, even cross examination. Once a
defendant testifies, his credibility is indisputably an issue.38 Finally,
the availability of impeachment use is less likely to discourage a de-
fendant from exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege then is the
availability of the material's substantive use. Substantive use of pre-
arrest silence is more likely to "chill" a defendant's decision to exercise
his or her privilege against self-incrimination than is its impeachment
use.
3 9
2. Substantive Evidence of Guilt
Although the Supreme Court did endorse the prosecutorial use of
pre-arrest silence in Jenkins v. Anderson,4 0 the Court's holding re-
stricted the use of such evidence to impeachment purposes only.41
The Jenkins Court explicitly left open the constitutionality of the sub-
stantive use of pre-arrest silence, and has not revisited the issue
since.4
2
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have acknowledged that
Supreme Court precedent requires that courts distinguish between
impeachment and substantive use of pre-arrest silence.43 In Coppola
v. Powell,44 the defendant told the police, prior to his arrest, that he
was not going to confess and was unwilling to speak further without
his lawyer present.45 The First Circuit held that, because the defen-
dant did not testify at trial, the prosecution could not use the pre-ar-
rest silence for impeachment purposes because there was nothing to
impeach. 46
36. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
37. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896).
38. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2276, at 463-69
(McNaughten ed., rev. ed. 1961).
39. See generally Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33 (1973)(discussing in gen-
eral terms the chilling effect of using illegally obtained evidence).
40. 447 U.S. 231.
41. See id. at 238.
42. See id.; infra Part I.C (discussing the circuit split).
43. See United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v.
Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v.
Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987).
44. 878 F.2d 1562.
45. See id. at 1563-64.
46. See id. at 1567-68.
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Likewise, in United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane,4 7 the Seventh
Circuit did not allow the prosecution to use the defendant's pre-arrest
refusal to answer police inquiries as evidence of guilt, because he did
not testify at trial. 48 The Savory court distinguished between im-
peachment cases, in which the defendant "opens himself to impeach-
ment by taking the stand," and the case before it, in which the
defendant chose not to take the stand.49
Alternatively, the substantive use of pre-arrest silence is allowed
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.5 O Citing Jenkins, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that the government may comment on a defendant's si-
lence if it occurred prior to the time he was arrested and given Mi-
randa warnings.51 However, the Eleventh Circuit made no mention of
the fact that the silence in Jenkins was used for impeachment pur-
poses rather than substantive evidence of guilt.5 2 In Jenkins, the
Court expressly refused to decide whether such use violated a defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment privilege.5
3
C. The Split in the Circuit Courts
The Supreme Court has never addressed the use of pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence in the prosecution's case-in-chief as substantive evi-
dence of guilt.54 The variation in treatment of comments on pre-ar-
rest silence among the circuit courts and the absence of controlling
Supreme Court precedent has resulted in significant confusion among
the circuits.55 Several petitions for certiorari have been filed on the
47. 832 F.2d 1011.
48. See id. at 1018-1020. Relying on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the
Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201.
49. 832 F.2d at 1017-1018.
50. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ri-
vera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
51. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568.
52. See id.
53. See 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
54. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1996)(discussing this
proposition).
55. See, e.g., Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593 (holding that the defendant's silence was not
induced by a government agent and was not in response to a government agent's
questions); Thompson, 82 F.3d at 856 (holding that due to the lack of controlling
authority and the current circuit court split on the issue, the court could not find
"plain error" in the trial court's failure to exclude evidence of pre-arrest silence);
United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1031 (1992) (holding that outside the coercive setting of custodial interrogation,
willingness to answer some questions can be properly given greater weight in
deciding whether the willingness forfeits the right to object to comment on a re-
fusal to answer a particular question); Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568 (holding that the
government may comment on a defendant's silence if it occurs before arrest and
before Miranda warnings or after arrest but before Miranda warnings); United
States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the govern-
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issue, but the Court has consistently denied them.56 This split has
left the lower courts to fend for themselves, resulting in great inconsis-
tency in the treatment of the issue.57
1. Majority Opinion
The majority of jurisdictions have held that the use of pre-arrest
silence as substantive evidence of guilt is a violation of a person's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For example, the
First, Seventh, Tenth, and most recently, Sixth Circuits prohibit a
prosecutor's use of a defendant's decision to remain silent whenever
such use could penalize the defendant from exercising his or her con-
stitutional rights.5S These circuits' primary rationale for disallowing
the use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt comes
from the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. California.59
Under Griffin, however, the Supreme Court merely prohibited
comment on the accused's silence occurring at trial, not before ar-
rest.6 0 Therefore, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits' pro-
tection of pre-arrest silence from the prosecution's case-in-chief is not
actually required by the Griffin holding.61
2. Minority Opinion
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits favor the use of pre-arrest silence
as evidence of guilt.62 Both circuits rely on the Court's holding in Jen-
kins v. Anderson.63 The Jenkins court, however, failed to follow the
ment may use a defendant's silence against him when such silence occurs prior to
arrest or indictment and at a time when the defendant is not in custody); United
States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that Jenkins may allow
the prosecution to use evidence of pre-arrest silence, but declining to decide the
issue as any error resulting from the introduction of the defendant's silence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1078 (1994); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1031 (1992); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562,
1565 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989).
57. See Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201; Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1565; United States ex rel.
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987).
58. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burson,
952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st
Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir.
1987).
59. See infra Part IA regarding the inappropriate application of Griffin, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
60. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15; infra Part IA
61. See infra Part lIIA.
62. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ri-
vera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
63. 447 U.S. 231.
2000]
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view it had adopted in Griffin that the Fifth Amendment provides an
absolute right to silence, holding instead that courts must employ an
"impermissible burden" test to determine the constitutionality of im-
peachment use of pre-arrest silence. 64 Notably missing from the Jen-
kins decision is any discussion on the use of pre-arrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt.
Regardless of Jenkins' omission, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
relied on Jenkins to justify their arguments favoring the use of pre-
arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt.65 In fact, the Eleventh
Circuit put an end to any confusion over the constitutional status of
an individual's pre-arrest silence when it stated that "the law of this
circuit is settled that evidence of pre-Miranda silence is admissible in
the government's case-in-chief as substantive proof of guilt."6 6
To classify the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as the only minority
holdings is no longer accurate. The Ninth Circuit appears to have
joined their camp with its decision in Oplinger.67 But unlike the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit expressed reservations about
using Jenkins to reach its decision.68
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated "whether or to what
extent pre-arrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment."69 To assert that pre-.arrest silence is clearly not allowed as sub-
stantive evidence of guilt7o or, on the other hand, that pre-arrest
silence is clearly allowed as substantive evidence of guilt 7 ' are both
conceptually mistaken assertions. Simply put, the correct answer to
the question is ".. . it depends." What "it" depends on is the context of
the situation leading to the defendant's silence. Indeed, the unique
context of Oplinger underscores the need for a more appropriate reso-
lution of whether and to what extent pre-arrest silence is actually
privileged under the Fifth Amendment.
A. Pre-Arrest Silence Is Not Completely Privileged
The Oplinger Court was correct to "respectfully disagree with the
First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, which have all held that pre-arrest
silence comes within the proscription against commenting on a defen-
64. See id. at 236.
65. See infra Part II.B discussing the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' reliance on Jen-
kins, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
66. United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1108 (11th Cir. 1995).
67. See Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1066-67.
68. See id.
69. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
70. See infra Part I.A.
71. See infra Part U.B.
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dant's privilege against seif-incrimination."72 The fundamental weak-
ness in these circuits' holding is that they each rely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin v. California to justify their prohibitions
against the use of pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt.73
This reliance on Griffin produced suspect analysis. For example,
in Savory, the Seventh Circuit found the reference to a defendant's
pre-arrest silence "to be of constitutional magnitude."74 The Savory
court commenced its constitutional analysis by reasoning that "be-
cause appellant [defendant] did not take the stand... the problem
involves the application of Griffin v. California" rather than "Jenkins
v. Anderson... [which] is distinguishable... [because in Jenkins] the
government used the defendant's silence to impeach trial testi-
mony."75 The court provided little analysis as to why Jenkins was not
the controlling precedent, since Jenkins actually dealt with pre-arrest
silence and Griffin did not. The Savory court merely assumed that
pre-arrest silence is constitutionally privileged and simply applied the
Griffin holding.
Like the Seventh Circuit in Savory, the First and Tenth Circuits
relied on Griffin to protect pre-arrest silence but provided minimal
justification for extending the Griffin holding to the pre-arrest set-
ting.T6 A more reasoned approach would have been to include an ap-
plication of Jenkins' "impermissible burden" test. Under that
framework, pre-arrest silence is not automatically privileged, but still
may be inadmissible if the pre-arrest evidence77 impermissibly bur-
dens the defendant's right to take the stand at trial.78 This test seems
to appreciate the governmental coercion that, without a doubt, justi-
fies a defendant's assertion of his or her privilege against self-
incrimination.79
Although the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits inevitably reached
the correct decision in their respective cases, they create an incom-
plete precedent. These circuits improperly extend the holding in Grif-
fin and imply a blanket rule that all pre-arrest silence is
constitutionally privileged. Such a blanket rule does not provide a
court with the flexibility to deal with situations such as Oplinger,
where the defendant is not faced with the actual threat of governmen-
tal coercion. In essence, these circuits failed to provide a convincing
groundwork for future decisions regarding pre-arrest silence.
72. Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1067.
73. See Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201; Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1568; Savory, 832 F.2d at
1017.
74. Savory, 832 F.2d at 1018.
75. Id. at 1017.
76. See Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201; Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1568.
77. See infra Part 11.C.
78. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
79. See id.
2000]
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B. The Jenkins Decision Improperly Extended
Although the Ninth Circuit concedes that the Supreme Court in
Jenkins v. Anderson "[did not] rule on the constitutionality of the use
of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt,"8 0
it did fall in line with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits by concluding
that pre-arrest silence may indeed be used to imply a defendant's
guilt.s1 The thrust of these circuits' reasoning derives from Jenkins,82
but extending the Jenkins rule in this fashion could prove highly
problematic.8
3
The faulty logic of applying Jenkins was obvious in United States v.
Rivera,8 4 where the prosecutor introduced evidence in its case-in-chief
that the defendant had remained silent during the pre-arrest investi-
gation. The prosecutor used the prior silence not to impeach the de-
fendant's credibility - the defendant failed to testify at trial - but as
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit supported the lower court's decision with a reference to Jen-
kins, but failed to note that Jenkins applies specifically to impeach-
ment use and leaves open the propriety of substantive use of pre-
arrest silence.8 5 Despite these apparent misapplications of the Jen-
kins rule, the Eleventh Circuit in Rivera held fast and made clear that
Jenkins extends to substantive use of pre-arrest silence.
8 6
Such an extension of Jenkins ignores the pervasive federal and
state evidentiary rules that distinguish between comment on privi-
leged silence to impeach a defendant's testimony and comment on a
defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief.8 7 These circuits fumdamentally misconstrue the
explicit reasoning behind the Jenkins Court's unwillingness to extend
protection to a testifying defendant's pre-arrest silence: "impeach-
ment follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of
silence and advances the truth-finding function of criminal trial."
8 8
Jenkins is limited to instances where a defendant chooses to testify;
barring this step, the Jenkins holding should not apply.
80. 150 F.3d at 1066. See supra Part II.B for a discussion on the Jenkins holding
that the government may comment on a defendant's pre-arrest silence for im-
peachment purposes.
81. See Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1066.
82. See supra Part II.B.
83. See id.
84. 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
85. See id. at 1568; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
86. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568.
87. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Evidentiary Use of Silence and the Constitutional Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 191, 192 (1984).
88. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239.
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The Supreme Court has made careful distinctions between im-
peachment and substantive use of pre-arrest silence.8 9 Therefore, to
the extent that the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits' holdings were the re-
sult of a mirror application of Jenkins to circumstances where the de-
fendant chose not to testify, these decisions were wrongly decided.
Each of these courts should have recognized that impeachment use of
silence presents a materially different issue from evidentiary use of
such silence and that a reflexive extension of the Jenkins holding to a
non-testifying defendant is erroneous. 90
The policies that support the exclusion of pre-arrest silence as sub-
stantive evidence of guilt are first and foremost based upon Fifth
Amendment privileges. Allowing the prosecution to use a defendant's
silence to imply guilt may potentially violate the Fifth Amendment's
function of protecting the innocent. Moreover, as New York's highest
court has explained, "it is an unfortunate truth that many people in
our society, especially those involved in the life of the street, view the
police as antagonists rather than protectors and react to police contact
with extreme suspicion, distrust, and lack of cooperation."91 Police in-
terrogation is an intimidating prospect to both the guilty and the inno-
cent and the presence of the police may shock, frighten, or confuse the
defendant.
An instance where pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt may run
counter to the Fifth Amendment privilege occurs when an defendant
charged with murder may have killed in justifiable self-defense. 92 If
the defendant is afraid that the police will not believe his story or feels
morally responsible for the death, he may claim the Fifth Amendment
privilege and refuse to answer questions prior to arrest. To allow this
silence to be used to show the defendant's guilt may defeat the impor-
tant Fifth Amendment purpose of protecting the innocent.9 3 When-
ever the prosecution implies guilt from silence a jury may see guilt,
which may be untrue, and it is inconsistent with the Fifth Amend-
ment's policy of protecting the innocent.94
Another policy concern regarding the evidentiary use of pre-arrest
silence is deterrence of police misconduct. As one state supreme court
has opined, if the police know that a defendant's pre-arrest silence is
available for use at trial and the post-arrest silence is not, the police
have incentives to manipulate the time of arrest and delivery of the
89. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the differences between the material's im-
peachment and substantive use.
90. Although the Zanabria Court did not cite Jenkins, the court was most likely in-
fluenced by the peijury-prevention rationale that guides the impeachment line of
cases.
91. People v. Conyers, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 408 (1980).
92. See Eawn GRIswoLD, THE FIm AmNDumNT TODAY 3 (1955).
93. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
94. See id.
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Miranda warning to ensure that the defendant's silence in the face of
accusation is admissible. 95
Use of pre-arrest silence to imply guilt cannot be justified without
an understanding of legitimate Fifth Amendment policy concerns.
Unfortunately, the Jenkins Court did not explain what it believed to
be the policies behind the Fifth Amendment.96 A blind reliance on
Jenkins to justify use of pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt leads to
improper results. For, just as a blanket rule for disallowing any use of
pre-arrest silence is misguided, a similar blanket rule that allows the
court to easily admit pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt is similarly
misguided.
C. Pre-Arrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt is Contextual
Even though "it depends" provides wobbly analysis,97 there is
value in examining the context of when pre-arrest silence should re-
ceive Fifth Amendment privilege. The Supreme Court has indicated
that it will apply general Fifth Amendment principles in order to de-
termine whether a given statement is within the reach of the privilege
against self-incrimination.98 To be within the scope of the privilege,
two elements must be present: testimonial evidence and compulsion. 99
Turning to the first element, treating a defendant's prior silence as
testimony has a long pedigree in the doctrine of "assenting silence." 00
The doctrine holds that an individual's silence in the face of accusa-
tions of crime made in his hearing, provided that he had the opportu-
nity to respond, may be used as a tacit admission of the truth of the
facts contained in the statement. 01 Therefore, silence in the face of
police questioning clearly meets the threshold requirement that the
act be testimonial in character.
The more critical element of asserting the privilege is the presence
of physical or moral compulsion exerted on the person asserting the
privilege.102 This coercion requirement comes directly from the lan-
guage of the privilege, which commands that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."103 Thus,
the constitutional rule is that pre-arrest silence, not associated with
government coercion, is not privileged because the pre-arrest choice to
speak or remain silent is not compelled by a state actor. To be sure,
95. See Tortolito v. Wyoming, 901 P.2d 387, 390-91 (Wyo. 1995).
96. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
97. See supra Part HI.
98. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983).
99. See id. at 561-62.
100. See E. CLEARY, McCoRMICKS HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185.
101. See id.
102. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 562.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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the United States Supreme Court has held that it is axiomatic that
the commands of the Constitution are directed at governmental enti-
ties and that state action is a prerequisite to the assertion of those
rights contained in the Fifth Amendment. 0 4
Based upon this governmental coercion prerequisite, the Oplinger
court made a precise observation regarding the First, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits. The Oplinger court noted that "in all three cases, the
party seeking to assert the privilege against self-incrimination was
questioned by a government official. 0 5 This lack of governmental co-
ercion in Oplinger differentiated it from the First, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuit cases. The Oplinger court, therefore, was obliged to reject the
defendant's claim of privilege regarding his pre-arrest silence. The
problem with the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits is that, though
decided correctly, they reached their holdings based upon an incorrect
analysis.O6
Turning to the circuits with which the Ninth Circuit allied itself,
the Oplinger court did not recognize the fact that the defendants in
Zanabria and Rivera were also detained and questioned by govern-
ment officials. 10 7 Ironically, although the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
were correct in acknowledging that pre-arrest silence may be used as
substantive evidence of guilt, their conclusions inevitably collapse
under the weight of their specious analysis.108
The Fifth Circuit in Zanabria justified the use of the pre-arrest
silence because "the silence at issue was neither induced by nor a re-
sponse to any action by a government agent."'0 9 The Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that the "compulsion" element did not exist in Zanabria.
However, to assert that Zanabria was under no official compulsion to
speak or remain silent completely ignores the context of Zanabria. Ul-
timately, the Fifth Circuit provides no explanation as to why a drug
search does not qualify as express governmental coercion. 110
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Rivera fares no better
than the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Zanabria. Citing Jenkins, the Ri-
vera court held that "[tihe government may comment on a defendant's
silence if it occurred prior to the time he is arrested and given his
Miranda warnings.""' However, the court made no mention of the
104. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986).
105. See 150 F.3d at 1067 n.6.
106. See supra Part I.A.
107. See Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 592; Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1565. Both Zanabria and Ri-
vera were searched by U.S. Customs Inspectors.
108. See supra lI.B for a discussion of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' questionable
analysis regarding the use of pre-arrest silence to infer guilt.
109. Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593.
110. See infra Part IH.C.1 for a discussion on how "coercion7 relates to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
111. Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568.
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fact that the silence in Jenkins was used for impeachment
purposes.i 1 2
The context of governmental coercion must be examined in order to
provide a framework for understanding to what extent pre-arrest si-
lence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. For example, one could label "express governmental
coercion" as coercion resulting from actual contact with a government
official.113 Coercion of this nature is privileged. On the other hand,
"implied governmental coercion" results when a defendant merely
presumes contact with a government official. Coercion of this nature
is not privileged.
1. Context One: Express Governmental Coercion
The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment has virtu-
ally no legislative history.114 However, in Brown v. Walker, the Su-
preme Court established a threshold test, where in order to claim
protection of the Fifth Amendment, the witness must show that her
fear of conviction is real and substantial rather than merely specula-
tive.ii 5 Hence, express governmental coercion is best understood as
the traditional contact that a criminal defendant has with law enforce-
ment.1 ' 6 Simply put, whenever physical, moral, or psychological coer-
cion has a real and substantial opportunity to be expressed between a
defendant and a governmental official, express coercion may exist."i 7
Subsequently, prior to either arrest or a Miranda warning, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination may still apply.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Burson fits within
the context of express governmental coercion even though the govern-
ment agent was an IRS investigator and Burson was neither in cus-
tody during the attempted questioning nor advised of his privilege
against self-incrimination.1s Burson had effectively invoked the priv-
ilege because "Mr. Burson knew he was being interrogated as part of a
criminal investigation.. . (and) Mr. Burson was clearly not going to
answer any of the IRS agent's questions.""i 9
112. See supra HLI.B for a discussion on the Eleventh Circuit's misapplication of
Jenkins.
113. The terms "express" and "implied" coercion are presented only as conceptual
short-hands. Neither term is legally operative language.
114. See United States v. Gecas, 830 F. Supp. 1403, 1414 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
115. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
116. Of course, this definition may extend beyond traditional law enforcement officers
to encompass any governmental agent holding general criminal investigatory
powers.
117. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
118. See Burson, 952 F.2d at 1200-01.
119. Id.
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On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Oplinger does
not fit within the context of express governmental coercion. No gov-
ernmental agent was involved with the questioning and the only men-
tion of potential governmental involvement was in the context of
Oplinger's employer reporting his offense to the FBI.120 Therefore, the
involvement of the FBI remained merely "speculative."1 21 If, on the
other hand, an FBI agent was waiting outside the door and entered
the room, Oplinger could at that point invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege.
2. Context Two: Implied Governmental Coercion
Asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege based upon potential con-
tact with law enforcement is clearly unwarranted under the Constitu-
tion.1 22 In other words, the mere implication that a defendant may
eventually face legal consequences does not trigger the privilege. For
example, even if a defendant had no contact with law enforcement
prior to his arrest, he might neveriheless argue that substantive use
of his pre-arrest "failure to come forward" satisfies the state action
requirement. Such a defendant might claim that the choice to come
forward was induced by state action in the sense that he feared conse-
quences that the state might impose on him if he volunteered informa-
tion. Similarly, he might claim that he knew that state agents were
investigating the crime in question and this investigation prevented
him from coming forward because he was afraid to admit his knowl-
edge, however innocent, of the crime.
Under these approaches, however, the defendant's reasons for not
coming forward more likely result from his own actions or knowledge
of facts relating to the crime rather than any intervening act on the
part of the state. Any pressure to be silent under such circumstances
is best characterized as "moral and psychological pressure to confess
emanating from sources other than governmental coercion."1
2 3
If pre-arrest silence does not arise out of state contact, and is there-
fore non-privileged, the pre-arrest silence would be evaluated like any
other piece of evidence. The United States Supreme Court has ex-
pressly rejected the notion that the mere force of evidence is compul-
sion of the sort forbidden by the privilege. If the pre-arrest silence is
used by the prosecution as inculpatory evidence, then the burden on
the right to trial silence is analytically equivalent to the burden that
120. See infra Part EIH.C.2 discussing "implied governmental coercion."
121. 150 F.3d at 1066.
122. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241 (Justice Stevens's concurring opinion states that
[t]he fact that a citizen has a constitutional right to remain silent when he is
questioned has no bearing on the probative significance of his silence before he
has any contact with the police...
123. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170.
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always exists when the defendant decides not to testify in the face of
inculpatory evidence against him.124 In essence, the fact that the de-
fendant may be persuaded to speak at trial in order to counter the
state's damning evidence is merely a function of the adversarial
process.31 25
As demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit in Oplinger, the context of a
defendant's pre-arrest silence must be carefully examined. Pre-arrest
silence not arising out of express governmental coercion is not privi-
leged under the Fifth Amendment because the pre-arrest choice to
speak or remain silent is not compelled by a state actor. However, if
the pre-arrest silence is the result of express governmental coercion,
the Fifth Amendment privilege attaches to the silence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The criminally accused possess the fundamental privilege against
self-incrimination. Our Constitution guarantees that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."126
However, the Oplinger decision reminds us that "[t]he self-incrimina-
tion clause was intended as a limitation on the investigative tech-
niques of government, not as an individual right against the
world."127 In the end, Oplinger was correctly decided because it prop-
erly applied the Fifth Amendment to the context of the coercion faced
by the defendant.
Because several circuits are split on the proper use of pre-arrest
silence, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and resolve the
confusion. In settling this issue, the Supreme Court should look at the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Oplinger in order to better understand the
contextual nuances of pre-arrest silence.
Meanwhile, back in Mayberry, Gomer's testimony regarding Bar-
ney's silence may be used as substantive evidence at trial subject to
federal evidentiary rules. As much as Gomer wants to make a "citi-
zen's arrest," this is a far cry from filling the shoes of actual law en-
forcement. Had Sheriff Andy showed up instead of Gomer, the context
would have been different and Barney's silence could not be used as
evidence to imply his guilt.
Craig W. Strong
124. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
125. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1965). Indeed, preserving
the values of adversarial system is one of the traditional justifications for Fifth
Amendment protection.
126. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
127. 150 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1456).
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